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Abstract: 
We compute ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for the regulation in three service sectors 
(i.e. fixed telecom, mobile telecom, distribution) applied by selected emerging countries. 
We start with qualitative information on the restrictions applied by each country in each 
sector; we apply a multivariate statistical approach to transform this qualitative data into 
a trade restrictiveness synthetic index (STRI).  In a second stage we estimate the average 
impact of STRI on price cost margins. In the third stage, this impact is used to calculate 
the AVE of the STRI estimated in the first step. It is shown that the STRI has a 
significant effect on the price-cost margins of the individual firms only when controlled 
for Regional trade Agreements and exception to the MFN clause in the considered sector. 
Lastly, we compute tariff equivalents for the STRIs previously calculated using the 
estimated impact. More than half our AVEs are larger than 50% and one AVE out of six 
is above 100%. 
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1 Introduction1 
Much of the studies addressing trade barriers in services have been relying on trade equation 
residuals to estimate tariff equivalents. The objective of this paper is on the contrary to rely on the 
observed sector-specific regulatory variables, that are qualitative information. The advantages of 
such an approach are obvious. Gravity equation residuals may be affected by potential 
specifications errors such as omitted variables and poor quality of the underlying data. Also such 
approaches do not address local presence, which is the principal mode of service provision 
abroad. We will illustrate this method for three sectors of services – distribution, fixed telecom, 
mobile telecom – and a sample of 11 emerging countries.2 
The survey methodology applied here has the advantage to rely on direct evidence from applied 
regulations, however it comes at a cost. This technique indeed is highly resource consuming, and 
this is why this method is unlikely to be applied across a wide range of sectors and countries. 
First qualitative information on barriers to services trade need to be collected. It is important that 
all the relevant restrictions are considered.  As this asks for an advanced knowledge of the sector, 
this first stage is normally conducted through a survey obtained from several acknowledged 
experts.  
We managed to treat information on services regulations existing in the mid-2000s on three 
services sectors (Distribution, Fixed Telecom and Mobile telecom) in Argentina, Brazil, China, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Tunisia, as 
provided  by the Queen Mary University (See Queen Mary University, 2009).  
                                                     
1
 We are indebted to Queen Mary University and Development Solutions and Nora Dihel for providing 
much of the data used in this research. We acknowledge inspiring comments and suggestions by two 
anonymous referees and the editor. All errors remain ours. 
2
 One questionnaire could not be coded (distribution in Thailand) hence we may consider 10 or 11 countries 
depending of the sectors. 
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Questions present in the original questionnaires are very precise and address many regulatory 
issues for the concerned sectors. For the fixed telecom sector, examples include “Is 
interconnection to the public switched network allowed legally?” or “What are the main 
criteria/procedures new entrants must satisfy to be granted a service license?”. Accordingly, an 
important part of this work was coding all the responses collected by the Queen Mary University, 
on a number of assumptions. While coding answers to the first question referred to as an example 
above is straightforward (it is dichotomic: either interconnection is allowed or not), coding the 
second example is more challenging. In the latter case we had to take into account the payment of 
a license fee, the occurrence of a competitive tender, the presence of an economic needs test, the 
request for submission of information and the possible discretionary decision by authority. We 
ensured that the coding process of this qualitative information remained fully transparent.3 In the 
second step all the qualitative information (e.g. the modes of attribution of licenses is different for 
foreigners; price caps are often determined by authorities, etc…) need to be transformed into 
quantitative data by an accurate scoring of the actual restriction according to their restrictiveness, 
on a scale ranging from zero (not restrictive) to one (highly restrictive). Finally all the scores are 
synthesized in a unique indicator, the so called “Synthetic Trade Restrictiveness Index” (STRI),4 
weighting together all the restrictions. We used an appropriate statistical method, the Principal 
Component analysis (PCA), to avoid assigning subjective weights (Section 2.1). As robustness, 
we attribute simple equal weights to all the measures. 
The second step was to enter the synthetic STRI as an explanatory variable in an econometric 
model, where the dependent variable is the price-cost margins of firms operating in a given 
sector. The methodology applied here assumes that regulatory measures impact on price and cost 
                                                     
3
 We provide in Appendix 1 the Coding schemes for the fixed telecom sector. The Coding schemes for the 
two remaining sectors are provided in the Web Appendix while the file summarizing coding assumptions is 
available to the interest reader upon request. 
4
 We will use the acronym STRI instead of TRI to avoid any confusion with the TRI approach used 
elsewhere in the literature on protection measurement. 
 4 
and that we can deduce from the change in the wedge the ad valorem equivalent of a tariff on 
prices. The bottom line is that costs increase more than prices as the regulation is reducing 
efficiency in the provision of services. The price-cost margin is indicative of the magnitude of the 
barriers, when determinants other than regulatory measures are properly controlled for (e.g. 
market concentration).  This calculation is done for a larger set of countries than in the survey, 
taking benefit of OECD surveys previously performed.  We are indebted to Nora Dihel for access 
to her large dataset (Dihel, 2007), which we used for the regression in order to obtain the average 
impact of the STRI on price cost margins (i.e. the ȕ coefficient of STRI).5 As robustness, we use 
an alternative STRI measure, computed by the Australian Productivity Commission that has 
pioneered studies in this field. 
Finally both STRI and the average effect of the STRI on price cost margins were used to compute 
the corresponding tariff equivalents for the sample of sectors and countries present in the Queen 
Mary University survey.  
A first significant limitation of the methodology is that the results from the empirical models do 
not differentiate the exact nature of the economic effects of the barriers (whether they are cost-
increasing or rent-creating for incumbent firms). However, while information on firm-level 
margins is relatively freely available, data on costs and prices separately is not. The available 
information allows only the effect on margins to be measured.  
A second limitation of the method is to rely on two different datasets, whereby the second is 
providing more observations to econometrically estimate the impact of STRI on price-cost 
margins. We however used a common PCA methodology for both datasets, in order to insure 
                                                     
5
 The Dihel dataset is very rich. For the fixed telecom sector, for instance, it includes variables such as 
capital intensity of production (total capital / net sales), percentage of digital mainlines, price-cost margin 
((EBIT + depreciation) / net Sales), labour productivity (net sales / number of employees). The detail and 
definition of these variables are provided in the Web Appendix. 
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consistency when the estimated average impact of the STRI is applied to our sample of observed 
countries. 
A third limitation of the method is that it cannot clearly state to what extent regulations are cost 
increasing or rent creating. We observe only the net effect. This is even more the case that we 
cannot identify whether the price-cost margin effect of a given measure is observed on individual 
firms with domestic or foreign ownership. What is the relation between rents and additional costs 
is a field of research deserving further investigation based on different data.  
Lastly and this is relevant for policy, preferential trading arrangements as well as most favored 
nation (MFN) exemptions introduce a further element of distortion. Foreign providers of services 
are discriminated, but not all to the same extent, what generate rents for the preferred ones, as any 
preference scheme. Taking into account RTAs and exemptions to the MFN clause allowed us to 
give a rough estimate of related margins and rents. 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used to 
calculate the STRIs and discusses the limitations of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
method; Section 3 estimates the economic impact of barriers to trade in services using the 
computed indexes. Section 4 explains how ad valorem equivalents were calculated. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2 Methodology to construct synthetic trade restrictiveness indexes  
This section focuses on the computation of aggregate STRIs for fixed telecom, mobile telecom 
and distribution, for selected emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Morocco, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Tunisia). The calculation of STRIs is 
based in information gathered from the responses to detailed questionnaires provided by the 
Queen Mary University. Although the data we received was extremely detailed, it does not 
contain information on separate restrictions related to the four modes of services provisions. 
Accordingly our restrictiveness indexes, as well as the tariff equivalents, are global indexes 
instead of modal ones.   We applied a multivariate statistical approach, known as PCA, in order to 
construct STRIs starting from the information contained in the questionnaires. 
There is however a drawback to such approach as the usage of the PCA method to derive STRI 
scores is subject to a series of limitations. Firstly, the ratio of the number of observations to 
variables must be at least five to one. While this condition on the dimensionality is fulfilled in our 
data, there is another important restriction which is more general. Using the PCA, there is no 
guarantee that a variable contributing largely to overall variance will necessarily contribute much 
to the restrictiveness of the regulations in the considered sector. Hence, attributing a large weight 
to this variable may be misleading. Lastly the number of ordered eigenvalues is impacting the 
results (we show that using more than one component is worth and extracts more information 
from the qualitative data). Against this background, we adopted the following strategy. Firstly, 
we adopt a different weighting scheme using our data. Secondly, we rely on alternative STRI 
available in the literature. Our results are overall robust to these changes in qualitative terms. 
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Even if the magnitude of the tariff equivalents may differ, the hierarchy of countries and sectors 
is mostly robust to these changes.  
These results call for further research on the construction of synthetic indicators, when qualitative 
information will be more systematically available. The bottom line is indeed that constructing 
such synthetic indicators summarizing the impact of a myriad of individual regulations 
necessarily implies a tradeoff between losing information and gaining in comprehension. Our 
method does not authorize to trace the impact of a single measure but provides with a broad 
overview of the protective impact of the set of regulations enforces by a country in a given 
service sector. 
2.1 Construction of the STRI  
A series of steps is involved in the calculation of STRI. Some important methodological choices 
are made in this paper, whose discussion requires detailed description of the methodology used. 
The first step is the collection of qualitative information on different regulations,6 and its coding 
on a zero to 1 scale to reflect increasing restrictiveness.7 As shown in Appendix A.1, the scoring 
used is common throughout regulations and sector, For instance, in the fixed telecom sector, we 
will code one a regulation making interconnections to the public switched network illegal. We 
code zero if such regulation does not exist in the country under consideration. If new entrants are 
required to use incumbents’ international gateway switch, we code one, and zero otherwise. The 
same logic applies to every sector and regulation, though we modulate the scoring for more 
complex cases (e.g. 0 if prices are market prices, 0.5 if the regulator sets a price cap, 1 if the price 
is administrated. Such scoring embodies expert judgment; this is why it must be kept transparent. 
                                                     
6
 Our source of information on trade barriers is Queen Mary University and Development Solutions (2009). 
7
 See Table in Appendix A-1 as an example for one sector. 
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We avoid attributing subjective weights to different restrictions;8 weights are derived directly 
from data derived using the PCA technique pioneered in the field of economic regulations by the 
OECD (Gonenc & Nicoletti, 2000; Steiner, 2000) and used extensively thereafter (Copenhagen 
Economics, 2005; Dihel, 2007; Marouani, 2009). The PCA avoids introducing expert judgment at 
that stage. 
Intuitively PCA is a variable reduction procedure. It is appropriate for measures for a number of 
observed variables in order to develop a smaller number of artificial variables (or principal 
components). In particular, as some variables are correlated, it is possible to reduce the number of 
observed variables into a smaller number of principal components that are able to account for 
most of the variance in the observed variables.  
More formally the STRI is considered to be a variable that is assumed to be linearly dependent on 
a set of n observable components, which in this case are the various restrictions, plus an error 
term. The total variation in the STRI then is made up of two orthogonal parts: a) variation due to 
the original variables; b) variation due to the error. 
Starting with the n collected variables on regulations, each is initially normalized by subtracting 
its mean value and dividing by its standard deviation. Then a correlation matrix C (n x n matrix) 
is calculated based on the standardized variables, to solve the equation |C – λI| = 0 for λ. This 
provides a nth degree polynomial equation in λ and hence k ≤ n roots known as the eigenvalues of 
the correlation matrix C. Next λ is arranged in descending order of magnitude, as λ1 > λβ >… λn. 
Corresponding to each value of λ, the matrix equation (C- λI)α=0 is solved for the 
nx1eigenvectors  (α1, α2 … αn). We then multiply each of the sets of raw data from the initial 
matrix containing the normalized information on barriers, by each of the eigen vectors to obtain n 
principal components variables, which have special statistical properties in terms of variance. In 
                                                     
8In the original work on TRI by a team of researchers from the Australian Productivity Commission and the 
University of Adelaide (see e.g. Warren, 2001; Kalirajan, 2000), scores and weights are based on subjective 
assignments. 
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fact PCA computes an orthogonal coordinate system such that the greatest variance in the 
orthogonal projection for the initial data lies in the first coordinate (first principal component), the 
second greatest variance lies in the second coordinate (second component), and so on. Finally, the 
STRI is calculated as the weighted average of the retained principal components, where weights 
are equal to the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix C, which ultimately represents the 
proportion of variance of each principal component ( e.g. . λ1= var (PC1) , λ2= var (PC2)…. λn= 
var (PCn) ). 
How many components need to be retained is an empirical matter and is impacting the results; 
most practitioners retain all components with an eigenvalue greater than 1 (considering the 
component to be as informative as the original data).9 While previous studies calculating STRIs 
in services used only the first component (e.g. Dihel and Sheperd, 2007), the first component 
represents only a part of the original variance (e.g. in our data, in the distribution sectors the first 
component explains only 32% of the original variance) and much information is excluded. 
In order to illustrate this, we show in Table 1 the STRI obtained first using only the first 
component (TRI_pc1), then using all relevant components (e.g. those with an eigenvalue greater 
than 1: TRI_pc1_pc…), then all components (TRI_all_pc) and finally the simple mean. Based on 
the different variants, the STRI are scaled so as to assign the value zero to the most liberal 
country (we calculate the STRI for each country before subtracting the minimum value of the 
STRI from each country’s STRI). The countries with the lowest STRI scores have the most 
liberal trade regimes. We can see that considering just one component strongly affects the results 
not only in terms of size but more importantly in terms of policy. Against this background we can 
compute a STRI using equal weights for all measures as robustness. We observe that results are 
overall consistent with our preferred method, though two differences appear. First, the absolute 
                                                     
9
 The number of components retained varies from sector to sector; here we use 4 components for each of 
the mobile and fixed telecommunications, and 3 components for distribution. 
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value of the STRI is smaller, which will impact the estimated impact of the STRI on price cost 
margins in the econometric step of the analysis (the estimated coefficient becomes larger). 
Second, some country-sector pairs move in the overall ranking. The latter outcome is no surprise 
and actually justifies our use of a more complex method to extract information from the 
qualitative data. The good news is that our econometric estimations, presented in Section 3, are 
robust to these changes of methodology, There are also robust to the use of different set of STRI, 
computed by the Australian Productivity Commission, for the same sectors and countries (though 
the Australian data covers less sectors). How we calculate the tariff equivalents by sector for the 
11 emerging economies is described in Section 4. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
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3 Measuring the economic impact of barriers to trade in services 
The main objective of the paper is to translate the restrictions observed in the services sectors, as 
measured by the STRIs index, into tariff equivalents, which can be thought of as hypothetical 
taxes, equivalent to the actual barriers faced by operators.  
In order to get tariff equivalents by sector for the emerging economies under analysis, two sets of 
information are required. First we need the value of the STRI, as calculated in Section 2.1. 
Second we need to measure how STRI affect the price-cost margin of service provisions. In this 
section we estimate the average net impact of barriers to service provision on firm`s price-cost 
margins, for each of the three sectors considered.  
For this second step we need a large set of countries.  Taking only the eleven emerging 
economies, we will have a too small number of observations, which will not allow us to perform 
the estimations needed. We need to introduce in the estimation more countries for the sectors 
under scrutiny. As the obtained coefficients will be extrapolated to our restricted database, we 
need to perform our PCA analysis on this extended dataset, in order to keep consistency. 
Interestingly, the five first ordered eigenvalues are always significant, while our data set leads to 
consider three to four eigenvalues depending of the country and sector.   We are grateful to Nora 
Dihel for allowing access to her dataset which includes qualitative information about restrictions 
to recalculate the STRIs for a large set of countries10. It also contains data for more than 90 firms 
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 The countries included in the telecommunication sectors are the : a large number of European economies 
(Austria,  Czech Republic, Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Switzerland, UK),  selected countries in Asia (China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand), 
Latin American (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru),  North America (Canada, USA and Mexico) and Australia 
and New Zealand. The economies considered in the distribution sector are the same as in the 
telecommunication sectors plus Honk Kong, Indonesia, Singapore, Sweden and Turkey. 
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for the two telecommunication sectors and 380 firms for the distribution sector over the period 
2002-2004.  
It should be pointed out that even if we use the same dataset, as in Dihel and Sheperd, 2007, our 
work is novel in terms of both the calculation of the STRIs and the applied econometric 
specifications. STRI are computed with our PCA approach in order to obtain econometric 
coefficients that can be consistently extrapolated to our data. 
3.1 Econometric specification 
The pattern of service provision generally requires local presence of the service provider. The 
exception is mode I trade in services, which represents a minor part of total trade in services 
within the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) definition. Also, provision of 
services is generally regulated by a public authority. These regulations are enforced for a series of 
reasons ranging from the need to ensure that the provider is properly qualified (law, surgery, etc.) 
to the need to ensure that the service provider is not taking unwarranted risks (banking, finance). 
Accordingly, the enforcement of regulation depends on a mix of informational asymmetries and 
potential externalities.  
Regulations have been applied at national level in an uncoordinated manner, which has resulted 
in differences across countries – a patter not specific to services. It requires firms to bear specific 
fixed costs to adapt their supplies for different destination markets (Kox and Nordas, 2007). 
In addition to this somewhat classical dimension to differences in domestic regulation, is the risk 
that in services, domestic and foreign providers may not receive similar treatment, depending on 
the GATS commitments in the different countries. Regulation generally increases the real 
resource costs of doing business (e.g. by requiring excessive paperwork) while at the same time 
limiting competition (creating pure rents for incumbent firms). The two effects impact on prices 
in the same direction: prices should rise, but what we observe is the net effect on margins. This is 
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to be recalled when interpreting the results of our estimations and computing the ad valorem 
equivalents of the presence of regulations. 
Lastly, countries discriminate not only between domestic and foreign providers of services, but 
also among foreign providers as a result of their involvement on Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs) – hence the creation of rents for firms from “preferred” countries.11 
Finally, the question that is addressed in this section is to what extent regulations impact on the 
price-cost margins of firms (domestic or foreign) located in a given country, and in a given 
industry. The main difficulty lies in disentangling the specific effects of the regulation from the 
effects of other determinants. Each firm`s profitability is affected by several factor specific to that 
firm (e.g. the market share of the considered firm, the firm size or the operational efficiency) 
along with other sectoral or economic-wide variables.12 A classical approach in the Industrial 
Organization literature is the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm that attributes to market 
concentration a key role in shaping price-cost margins (see Cowling and Waterson, 1976, for a 
derivation). Khalilzadeh-Shirazi (1974) is adding the growth of demand and the capital intensity 
of the firms among determinants plus indeed barriers to entry (the variable we are interested in).  
The recent literature on heterogeneous firms is pointing to the role of differences in productivity 
and market shares (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008): the distribution of margins across firms is 
actually responding to the number and average productivity of competing firms in the considered 
market. The same prediction that more productive firms charge higher mark-ups is obtained by 
Bernard et al. (2004). Based on this extensively documented evidence we introduce the 
productivity of the firm, its market share, its net sales growth, and its capital intensity as controls 
in our estimation of the impact of barriers of entry (STRI) on margins. In the distribution sector, 
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 The percentage of observations covered by an RTA in our sample ranges from 79% to 85% depending of 
the sector. 
12
 Profitability is defined as the sum of the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and depreciation, 
divided by net sales. 
 14 
we also rely on expert advice and add two variables: the solvency ratio and the efficiency of 
supply as key elements of competition in this capital intensive sector.  
Industry characteristics, such as the capital intensity, may impact on all firms in the same way in 
a given country, but not necessarily in all countries as market size matters (Melitz and Ottaviano, 
2008). Also, the presence of at least one MFN exemption in the considered sector will impact on 
all local firms in the same way.13 
All in all, when econometrically estimating the relationship between mark ups and the barriers to 
services provisions, the first challenge is to control for the various determinants of the price cost 
margins while accounting for collinearity among the explanatory variables.  
A second empirical challenge is to properly take account of the various dimensions of the data 
used: firm, sector and country level. In a given industry and a given country, all firms will be 
affected in the same way by certain sectoral characteristics. As a consequence, when individual 
price costs margins are regressed on their determinants, sectoral characteristics will be repeated as 
many times as there are firms in the particular industry in a given country, what imposes to 
cluster standard errors 
In the following, we use a through econometric analysis to measure, for each industry separately, 
the direct impact of the restrictiveness of national regulations (STRIs) to service provisions, 
dealing with all the empirical questions mentioned above. The estimations of the average impact 
of the STRIs, for the fixed telecom, mobile telecom and distribution, will be used in subsection 
3.3 to translate the synthetic STRIs computed in sub-section 2.1 into valorem equivalents.  
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 However the number of observations covered by an MFN exemption is less frequent in our sample than 
for RTAs (44% to 63% depending of the sector). 
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3.2 Data and variables 
Our objective is to measure the average economic impact of the barriers applied to three services 
sectors: fixed telecom, mobile telecom and distribution.  
For each service sector separately, we estimate the following econometric model: 
(1)  PCMfic = c + α(controls fic) + Ȗ(controls ic) + ȕ STRI ic + εfic 
 
The price-cost margin for each firm (subscript f) in a given sector (subscript i) across countries 
(subscript c) is explained by a constant, a set of firm and country control variables, the aggregate 
STRIs representing the restrictiveness of the regulation applied by each country in that sector and 
a white error term. 
Two decisions are central: the set of variables to be included as controls and the type of STRIs 
(those computed considering the first principal component only, the weighting average of the 
most relevant components or the weighting average of all the components). 
The main interest would be in the magnitude of the coefficient ȕ. However, its sign is also 
important. If  ȕ is positive we will interpret the barriers as rent-creating. On the contrary if the 
sign is negative the barriers would be cost increasing. Obviously services restrictions might affect 
price and costs simultaneously. Kalirajan (2000) interprets the reduction in price-cost margins 
associated with restrictive regulations in cost-creating terms; more precisely there is a greater 
increase in costs than in prices.  However he provides a series of arguments showing why such 
interpretation might be risky. The bottom line is that a negative (or positive) sign is difficult to 
interpret and might only provide indirect evidence of some sort of net effect. To disentangle the 
two effects we would need data on prices and costs separately at the firm and sectoral level.  
Unfortunately such data is available for a very limited number of countries, so we have to rely on 
the information on firm level margins which is relatively easier to get. Accordingly it is very 
difficult to definitely interpret our results in terms of rent or cost. 
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All the data necessary to perform econometric estimations is the same as in Dihel and Sheperd 
(2007). The number of observations varies from one sector to another. The dataset contains yearly 
data for more than 90 firms for the two telecommunication sectors from 28 countries and 380 
firms for the distribution one from 3314 countries, over the period 2002-2004.  
As already mentioned, even using the same data, our work differs from the study by Dihel and 
Sheperd in two ways. First the aggregate trade restrictiveness index is recomputed for each 
country and industry, relying on a different methodology that is consistent with the one applied in 
sub-section 2.1. Hence, we consider either the STRI computed via the first principal component 
or as the weighted average of the most relevant principal components. Second, we use an 
econometric specification that differs in terms of the variables considered and the econometric 
technique applied.  
For the three services sectors we consider the price-cost margin of each firm, as defined in 
footnote 10.  
Concerning the controls affecting the firm`s profitability, other than the STRIs, the list of 
available variables is the following: 
- The apparent productivity of the firm, defined as log of the ratio of net sales over number 
of employees; 
- The firm market share defined as the log of ratio of  net sales over total industry net sales; 
- The annual (log) growth in the sales of the considered firm; 
- The capital intensity of production defined as the log of  ratio of total capital over net 
sales, measured at firm level;  
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 For the complete list of countries included in the dataset see notes 9 and 10. 
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- In the distribution sector, we also control for the solvency ratio (total debt/(total capital + 
short term debt)) and the efficiency of supply (total inventories/net sales). 
- The STRIs for each country, alternatively computed considering the principal component 
only or as the weighted average of the significant components. Obviously our preferred 
specification is that which includes the weighted STRI. 
- Previous STRI interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has signed at 
least one RTA covering the sector; 
- Same STRI interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has at least one 
MFN exemption for the sector; 
The list of the available variables raises the problems of potential collinearity between certain of 
them as net sales appear in the denominator of the right-hand side of the equation taken in 
logarithm. This specification is imposed by determinants derived from theory. We have run 
univariate (unreported) regressions to double check that the sign and significance of our 
explanatory variables were not affected. Finally we performed alternatively regressions with and 
without the solvency ratio (See Table 4).        
As correctly observed by Dihel and Sheperd (2007) the combined presence of firm and country 
level variables leads to incorrect statistical inference.  Clustering the error terms at country level 
can be preferred to performing two-stage estimations (Woolridge, 2003). 
3.3     Results  
We start by replicating the approach in Dihel and Sheperd (2007) – namely by relying on the 
STRI calculated using only the first principal component (STRI_1), firstly for the fixed telecom 
 18 
sector.15 The results are presented in columns (1) to (3) in Table 2, while columns (4) to (6) of 
Table 2 use the weighted average of the significant principal components (STRI_weighted) .  
-Table 2 about here- 
The results are encouraging given the limited number of observations: most selected variables are 
significant, and roughly half of the variance in individual price cost margins is explained. The 
only variable that is not significant is firm productivity. Firm’s market share shows an increased 
price cost margin, consistent with the usual imperfect competition framework already mentioned. 
The growth of firm sales is also positively related to price cost margin, though with a wider 
margin of error. More capital intensive firms are also more profitable. We could argue that being 
more profitable allows higher investment. Accordingly reverse causality is not excluded. 
Productivity fails to be significant, a result that must be attributed to the poor proxy used. Instead 
of using the apparent labor productivity, Total Factor Productivity should have been used. 
However, data was not available to compute this variable. 
We next turn to our variables of interest, related to service regulation restrictiveness. First, we can 
see that the STRI has no significant effect on the price-cost margins of the individual firms in 
column (1), when it is introduced alone in the equation. This somewhat deceptive result is not 
altogether surprising however, since what is important is the discriminatory enforcement of these 
regulations across trading partners. This outcome is the result of an omitted variable, controlling 
for the fact that certain operators bypass the regulation constraints by being members of RTAS. 
When the terms are interacted between STRI and RTA or MFN, the STRI are shown to have a 
significant impact on price cost margins at the 1% confidence level. This impact is negative 
confirming our hypothesis that the cost-enhancing effect of the regulations dominates the anti-
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 Note however that Dihel and Sheperd (2007) rely on a two-stage estimation, which is not our strategy. 
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competitive advantages to incumbent firms. Though, if most regulations are cost increasing but 
they are less so in RTAs.  This explains the sign of the parameter on the interacted variable. 
Our interpretation is that preferential arrangements in the service sector  provide firms located in 
the partner countries that have signed these agreements, differential advantage over firms located 
in a third country. An RTA confers exporting advantages on a firm and so could well boost its 
price-cost margin. This ‘margin of preference’ is exploited in subsection γ.β to compute 
associated rents accruing to those firms.  
Next, we turn to the mobile telecom sector and proceed as before. The results are reported in 
Table 3. Compared to the fixed telecom sector, sales growth does not have a significant impact on 
price cost margin. The reasons for this are associated with the pricing strategies of firms. Sales 
growth is only achieved at very high cost in this industry, where ‘capturing’ a new client is costly 
(e.g. in terms of the mobile set provided free to new subscribers). Market share, on the other 
hand, has a very significant and positive effect on price-cost margin. In addition, MFN 
exemptions do not have an effect on price cost margins. A tentative explanation for this is that the 
core issue, of new licenses, is not controlled for here.  
-Table 3 about here- 
The last sector is distribution – results presented in Table 4. We observe a positive impact of sales 
growth, while market share is weakly significant. Here, again, capital intensity positively affects 
price cost margin. Productivity has a negative impact – possibly pointing to the transfer of 
productivity gains to the consumer in a rather competitive sector.  The two variables suggested by 
microeconomic evidence on competition in the sector (solvency and efficiency) are not 
significant. We obtain similar results for the other sectors considered in terms of the impact of the 
regulation, the exception being MFN, which is no longer significant, due to the already high 
competitive nature of the sector. 
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Two main concerns can be raised when considering this two-step exercise. Firstly, the outcome is 
impacted by the calculation of the STRI. Our weighting scheme based on the PCA is crucial here. 
To address this issue, we performed a robustness test consisting in replicating the whole exercise 
by using simple means of indicators. The magnitude of the estimated parameters does change as 
do the STRI values. But our results are overall robust to these changes. A different robustness test 
consists in using in our econometric estimations the STRI computed by other researchers, for the 
same countries and sectors. We relied on the Australian Productivity Commission calculations of 
STRI. Unfortunately, while this is possible for the distribution sector, the comparison is not direct 
in the case of the two telecom sub-sectors, as the difference is not made between mobile and fixed 
telecom in the Australian data. We thus aggregated our own indicators (using simple means) 
before performing estimations with this aggregated data and alternatively with the Australian 
data. Again our results were robust to these changes, though the precision of estimates for certain 
covariates (e.g. capital intensity) suffered from the aggregation of quite different sub-sectors.16 
- Table 4 about here – 
                                                     
16
 Results are not reported for sake of space, but are available to the interested reader. 
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4 Calculating Tariff Equivalents 
In this section we use both the value of the STRI for our selected emerging economies, for each 
of the three service sectors (see Section 2.1) and the average impact of the STRI on the price cost 
margin (the β coefficient for the STRI estimated above) to compute the ad valorem equivalents. 
The tariff equivalent applied by a given country c in a particular sector i is simply: 
(2)                                  

  1*100100
0
0
e
STRI
PCM
PCMPCMt c
c
cic
ic

 
where PCM0c refers to the price cost margin related to country c were it to have a STRI of zero, 
and all other factors were unchanged. More particularly, we rely on the coefficient estimated on 
the STRI when interaction with RTA and MFN are introduced and when more than one 
component is included in the construction of the STRI. In general, we use the coefficient in 
Column (6) of the tables in subsection 3.2. When the parameter on the MFN exemption is not 
significantly different from zero we rely on the estimation shown in Column 5.In terms of the 
value of STRI calculated in Section 2.1, in order to maintain compatibility with the regression 
results, we use the index calculated using the relevant principal components (results presented in 
the main text of this section).17  
Another novelty of our approach is that we consider the effects of RTAs and, in the case of fixed 
telecom, the effects of MFN exemptions. We noted in the previous section that trade barriers 
                                                     
17
 Alternatively, we tentatively included the results for the tariff equivalents using the STRI constructed 
with all principal components. Obviously, in this case, the smaller sizes of the STRI translate into smaller 
tariff equivalents. Also, the estimated coefficient is associated with a standard error. In order to take this 
into account, we recalculated the tariff adding and subtracting to ȕ the value of the standard error, which 
gives us lower and upper values respectively for the protection. Indeed, any variation in ȕ impacts on the 
value of the tariff equivalent obtained. Results are available upon request. 
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combined with RTA, tend to have rent-creating effects. The combination of these coefficients 
leads to the results shown in Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5.  
Before interpreting our results we must stress that the term “rent” is used is a rather loose way. 
MFN exemptions could lead to an increase in capital intensity, hence higher costs (e.g. an over-
investment of incumbents in the network to deter potential future entrants). Our understanding is 
that the rent created by the policy measure is invested in entry deterrence.  Based on this 
information we calculated what we refer to in Tables 4 to 6 as the “Preferential margin”, that is, 
the preference granted by the importing country to the countries with which it signed an RTA. In 
the case of the fixed telecom sector, we can also compute the ad valorem rent provided to local 
producers through the MFN exemption. 
According to our calculations, Argentina, Singapore and Brazil seem to be the least protected 
economies in all three sectors studied.  
The outcome for fixed telecom for Argentina, although in line with previous studies (Dihel and 
and Sheperd, 2007), is rather surprising bearing in mind the dominant position of historical 
providers in the sector.18 However, the result can be explained by the lack of information on 
restrictive regulation enforced by this Latin American country, or by the way that the qualitative 
information is coded. Finally, the calculation of STRI index is also affected by the way the PCA 
weights the various responses. 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5, provide two complementary pieces of information. Column (2) 
presents the percentage equivalent of the regulatory preferential margin associated to the presence 
of an RTA. For the partner countries having signed an RTA comprising clauses concerning the 
sector, the impact on firms providing services in the considered country is positive. Note that this 
impact is never large enough to overcome the negative impact of the regulation. But the 
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 Information on the market share of the three historical providers (90% in the mid-2000s) in 
telecommunication is provided in the questionnaires. 
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interesting outcome is that providers of services originating from third countries are excluded 
from this preferential treatment. In addition, Column (3) presents the percentage equivalent of the 
sum of the regulatory preferential margin and the rent conceded to domestic producers as a result 
of MFN exemption. Hence, the difference between Columns (3) and (2) represents the rent 
accruing to domestic provider of services in the considered country. This rent is quite large for 
India, Indonesia, Morocco and Philippines.  
The rent-creating effect of MFN exemptions is not significant in the regressions for the mobile 
telecom and distribution sectors, which makes it impossible to compute the rent creating effect of 
this distortion (Tables 5-6). 
-Table 5 about here- 
- Table 6 about here - 
We observe that the level of revealed protection is highly sector specific. For instance, India is 
quite liberal in the mobile sector, but much stricter in the distribution sector. Tunisia has stricter 
regulation in distribution than for the fixed telecom sector. 
Note that there is no ad valorem equivalent computed for Thailand in the distribution sector, since 
we could not use the questionnaire responses in this case. 
-Table 7 about here – 
Our paper is firstly related to works examining the impact of regulations and entries in the service 
sector on economic performance. Golub (2009) focus restrictions to foreign ownership and 
operational restrictions in various services industries ranging from Construction to Finance, and 
covers 73 developed and developing countries. These restrictions are scaled from 0 (open) to 1 
(closed) for each sector-country pair. However, no tariff equivalent of these restrictions is 
provided. Our work concerns distribution services in emerging economies and is thus also related 
to studies addressing the relation between the provision of retail services and trade in goods. 
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Nordas et al. (2008) rely on a gravity model integrating a retail sector. It is shown that the entry 
of international retailers has a positive impact on bilateral trade between investing and host 
countries. 
Finally our paper is even more tightly related to the growing literature on measuring the reforms 
regarding the provision of services in developing countries. Bottini et al. (2011) consider Egypt, 
Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon and compute trade restrictiveness indexes for the provision of 
services in the banking sector and in the fixed and mobile telecommunication sectors. The impact 
of these regulations on firm performance is used to estimate tax equivalents of service restrictions 
by sector. They obtain tariff equivalents in the foxed telecom sector ranging from 23% to 89% 
depending of the country and assumptions and 43% to 356% in the mobile sector. This compares 
with our values of respectively 0% to 141% and 0% to 153%. For the two countries present in 
both samples, we obtain 62% and 50% for Morocco (33% and 52% with Bottini et al aggregate 
measure) and 58% and 55% for Egypt (resp. 101% and 52%). Though reference years, 
questionnaires and methods differ, these estimates do not differ dramatically. This convergence in 
the results points to the gains for policy makers and researchers of a more systematic 
measurement of regulation in services at the detailed level.   
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5 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was to compute ad valorem equivalents for the regulation in three 
service sectors (i.e. fixed telecom, mobile telecom, distribution) applied by a group of emerging 
countries. We start with qualitative information on the restrictions applied by each country in 
each sector on the basis of which we applied a multivariate statistical approach, PCA, to 
transform this qualitative data into a synthetic index (STRI).    
We extracted as much information as possible from the original data, based on a statistical 
criterion, weighting the different components based on their contribution to the whole variance. 
For this first stage we used detailed questionnaire responses provided by the Queen Mary 
University.  
For the second stage, we used a large dataset provided by Dihel and Sheperd (2007) to estimate 
the average impact of STRI on firms` price-cost margins. The estimated parameters were used to 
compute ad valorem equivalents, by applying them to the STRIs previously calculated for the 
Queen Mary University survey. In addition to ad valorem equivalents of the regulation, our 
method provides ad valorem equivalents of the preferential margins and rents created by MFN 
exemptions clause. 
The value added of our work is accordingly threefold. We provide a series of new tariff 
equivalents, based on qualitative information; a coding structure to guide future qualitative 
studies is provided; we propose technical improvements to the estimation of restrictiveness 
indices and their impact on price cost margins.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: STRI with one component, weighted components and simple mean 
Telecom Fix            
Country Argentina Brazil Egypt India Indonesia Malaysia Morocco Philippines Singapore Thailand Tunisia 
STRI_pc1 1.04 7.70 1.39 0.00 0.63 1.33 2.54 2.05 1.64 3.08 2.36 
STRI_pc1_pc4 0.00 0.48 1.64 1.65 1.65 2.47 1.74 1.98 0.42 3.15 0.67 
STRI_all_pc 0.00 0.41 1.40 1.36 1.36 2.05 1.21 1.54 0.21 2.40 0.65 
Simple mean 0.08 0.26 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.48 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.22 
            
Telecom 
Mobile 
           
Country Argentina Brazil Egypt India Indonesia Malaysia Morocco Philippines Singapore Thailand Tunisia 
STRI_pc1 0.00 2.15 0.56 2.34 4.21 4.29 3.25 1.88 0.35 2.49 6.28 
STRI_pc1_pc4 0.00 1.30 1.52 1.24 3.19 2.73 1.40 1.83 1.16 2.33 2.59 
STRI_all_pc 0.00 0.38 0.57 0.45 1.15 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.43 0.86 0.67 
Simple mean 0.01 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.53 0.46 0.26 0.36 0.18 0.44 0.48 
            
Distribution            
Country Argentina Brazil Egypt India Indonesia Malaysia Morocco Philippines Singapore Thailand Tunisia 
STRI_pc1 1.65 1.38 4.70 2.41 3.15 2.83 3.33 1.87 0.00  6.35 
STRI_pc1_pc3 0.15 0.34 1.87 1.80 2.28 1.42 1.53 2.13 0.00  3.01 
STRI_all_pc 0.09 0.15 1.53 1.47 1.61 1.06 1.42 0.92 0.00  2.01 
Simple Mean 0.10 0.11 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.09  0.53 
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Table 2: Results of estimation for the fixed telecom sector 
Dep var : log firm 
level price-cost 
margins 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Productivity 0.0312 0.0601 0.0714 0.0330 0.0610 0.0904 
 (0.106) (0.112) (0.113) (0.104) (0.106) (0.112) 
Market share 0.0753** 0.0712* 0.0645* 0.0740** 0.0712** 0.0710** 
 (0.0313) (0.0345) (0.0325) (0.0303) (0.0328) (0.0306) 
Sales growth 0.395* 0.353* 0.300 0.394* 0.357* 0.311* 
 (0.222) (0.196) (0.178) (0.218) (0.195) (0.176) 
Capital intensity 0.658*** 0.643*** 0.635*** 0.660*** 0.641*** 0.618*** 
 (0.0952) (0.0886) (0.0842) (0.0960) (0.0893) (0.0775) 
STRI_1 
-0.0435 -0.201*** -0.194***    
 (0.0721) (0.0281) (0.0283)    
STRI_1*RTA 
 0.226*** 0.203***    
 
 (0.0657) (0.0702)    
STRI_1*MFN 
  0.182*    
 
  (0.0885)    
STRI_weighted 
   -0.0753 -0.322*** -0.280*** 
 
   (0.125) (0.0500) (0.0433) 
STRI_weighted*RTA 
    0.374*** 0.343*** 
 
    (0.0923) (0.0914) 
STRI_weighted*MFN 
     0.324* 
      (0.167) 
Constant -1.489** -1.707** -1.844** -1.471** -1.739** -2.080*** 
 (0.621) (0.679) (0.678) (0.621) (0.646) (0.625) 
       
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 
R-squared 0.436 0.454 0.462 0.436 0.454 0.473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 30 
 
Table 3: Results of estimation for the mobile telecom sector 
Dep var : log firm level 
price-cost margins 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Productivity 0.158 0.135 0.135 0.158 0.126 0.143 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.127) (0.117) (0.117) (0.130) 
Market share 0.0776*** 0.0761*** 0.0777*** 0.0767*** 0.0758*** 0.0836*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0214) (0.0252) 
Sales growth 0.351 0.211 0.194 0.362 0.243 0.226 
 (0.237) (0.176) (0.180) (0.236) (0.189) (0.182) 
Capital intensity 0.613*** 0.615*** 0.607*** 0.613*** 0.611*** 0.579*** 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.114) (0.117) (0.109) 
STRI_1 0.0143 -0.181*** -0.180***    
 (0.0553) (0.0490) (0.0484)    
STRI_1*RTA  0.250*** 0.240***    
  (0.0387) (0.0407)    
STRI_1*MFN   0.0624    
   (0.0912)    
STRI_weighted    0.0501 -0.326*** -0.292*** 
    (0.128) (0.102) (0.0973) 
STRI_weighted*RTA     0.507*** 0.450*** 
     (0.0971) (0.123) 
STRI_weighted*MFN      0.224 
      (0.167) 
Constant -2.309*** -2.204*** -2.218** -2.348*** -2.260*** -2.421*** 
 (0.768) (0.775) (0.789) (0.729) (0.725) (0.797) 
       
Observations 91 91 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.412 0.439 0.440 0.412 0.439 0.449 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Results of estimation for the distribution sector 
Dep var : log 
firm level 
price-cost 
margins 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Sales growth 0.184*** 0.205*** 0.194*** 0.186*** 0.194*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0432) (0.0461) (0.0388) (0.0462) (0.0520) 
Market share 0.000873 0.0161* 0.0175 0.00359 0.0176 0.0172* 
 (0.0107) (0.00837) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0112) (0.00886) 
Capital 
intensity 
0.609*** 0.617*** 0.639*** 0.636*** 0.646*** 0.647*** 
 (0.0342) (0.0264) (0.0319) (0.0428) (0.0317) (0.0246) 
Productivity 
-0.144** -0.192*** -0.154*** -0.118** -0.157*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0485) (0.0417) (0.0460) (0.0416) (0.0485) 
Efficiency 
-0.0112 -0.0128 -0.0223 -0.0206 -0.0198 -5.66e-05 
 (0.0336) (0.0319) (0.0313) (0.0279) (0.0295) (0.0297) 
Solvency 
-0.0360 -0.0386 -0.0327 -0.0240 -0.0338  
 (0.0269) (0.0233) (0.0229) (0.0274) (0.0220)  
STRI_1 
-0.0710* -0.141*** -0.139***    
 (0.0413) (0.0322) (0.0321)    
STRI_1*RTA 
 0.131*** 0.0919***    
 
 (0.0267) (0.0232)    
STRI_1*MFN 
  0.0661*    
 
  (0.0337)    
STRI_weighted 
   -0.154** -0.248*** -0.247*** 
 
   (0.0719) (0.0500) (0.0470) 
STRI_weighted
*RTA 
    0.129*** 0.116*** 
 
    (0.0311) (0.0365) 
STRI_weighted
*MFN 
     0.0665 
 
     (0.0422) 
Constant 
-0.840** -0.519 -0.735*** -0.969*** -0.606** -0.763** 
 (0.312) (0.304) (0.247) (0.283) (0.260) (0.293) 
       
Observations 388 360 360 388 360 390 
R-squared 0.499 0.583 0.588 0.506 0.588 0.567 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Tariff equivalents of regulations in the fixed telecom sector 
 (1) +1 standard 
error** 
-1 standard 
error** 
(2) (3) 
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Singapore 12.5 10.4 14.5 -2.6 -15.0 
Brazil 14.3 11.9 16.7 -3.0 -16.8 
Tunisia 20.7 17.2 24.2 -4.1 -22.9 
Egypt 58.2 47.3 69.8 -9.8 -46.9 
India 58.9 47.9 70.6 -9.9 -47.3 
Indonesia 58.9 47.9 70.7 -9.9 -47.3 
Morocco 62.7 50.9 75.5 -10.4 -49.0 
Philippines 74.2 59.9 89.8 -11.7 -53.6 
Malaysia 99.4 79.2 121.9 -14.4 -61.5 
Thailand 141.3 110.5 176.5 -18.0 -70.4 
Note: 
(1): Average impact of regulations applied to countries where there is no RTA 
(2): Regulatory preferential margin in presence of RTA  
(3): Sum of regulatory preferential margin and rent from MFN exemption 
**: the tariff equivalent is calculated adding and subtracting to ȕ the value of  its standard error 
Table 6: Tariff equivalents of regulations in the mobile telecom sector 
 (1) +1 standard 
error** 
-1 standard 
error** 
(2) (3) 
Argentina 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ns 
Singapore 40.2 25.3 57.0 -16.7 ns 
India 43.6 27.3 61.9 -17.8 ns 
Brazil 46.2 28.8 66.0 -18.6 ns 
Morocco 50.4 31.3 72.4 -19.8 ns 
Egypt 55.8 34.4 80.5 -21.3 ns 
Philippines 70.8 42.9 104.1 -25.1 ns 
Thailand 97.4 57.4 147.5 -30.8 ns 
Tunisia 112.9 65.5 173.9 -33.6 ns 
Malaysia 121.9 70.1 189.3 -35.0 ns 
Indonesia 153.6 86.0 245.8 -39.6 ns 
Note: 
(1): Average impact of regulations applied to countries where there is no RTA 
(2): Regulatory preferential margin in presence of RTA  
(3): Sum of regulatory preferential margin and rent from MFN exemption 
**: the tariff equivalent is calculated adding and subtracting to ȕ the value of  its standard error 
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Table 7: Tariff equivalents of regulations in the distribution sector 
 (1) +1 standard 
error** 
-1 standard 
error** 
(2) (3) 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 n.s. 
Argentina 3.9 3.1 4.7 -1.8 n.s. 
Brazil 8.8 7.0 10.7 -4.0 n.s. 
Malaysia 42.2 32.5 52.6 -15.5 n.s. 
Morocco 46.1 35.4 57.6 -16.6 n.s. 
India 56.3 42.9 71.0 -19.3 n.s. 
Egypt 59.1 44.9 74.7 -20.0 n.s. 
Philippines 69.5 52.4 88.5 -22.4 n.s. 
Indonesia 75.9 57.0 97.0 -23.7 n.s. 
Tunisia 110.9 81.5 145.0 -30.1 n.s. 
Thailand - - - - - 
Note: 
(1): Average impact of regulations applied to countries where there is no RTA 
(2): Regulatory preferential margin in presence of RTA  
(3): Sum of regulatory preferential margin and rent from MFN exemption 
**: the tariff equivalent is calculated adding and subtracting to ȕ the value of  its standard error 
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Appendix 1:  Components of the restrictiveness indices  
Table A-1 Coding scheme for fixed telecom 
 
Variable Name Corresponding item(s) in the questionnaire is 
precise questions 
Criteria for assigning value 
PolicyRestriction A 1) Are there policy, legal or regulatory 
restrictions on the provision of fixed line 
services? By any firm?  
1.00 : If restrictions exist for all segments, both 
for foreign and local firms 
0 : If no restriction exists 
Intermediate values depending on actual 
restrictions 
NB: If the restriction is only about licensing, it is 
not considered as a restriction, since such 
restriction actually applies in all countries. 
PolicyRestriction 
Foreign 
A 1) Are there policy, legal or regulatory 
restrictions on the provision of fixed line 
services? By foreign firms?  
1.00 : If restrictions exist for all segments, both 
for foreign and local firms 
0 : If no restriction exists 
Intermediate values: the complement of the 
maximum foreign equity share allowed 
NB: If the restriction is only about licensing, it is 
not considered as a restriction, since such 
restriction actually applies in all countries. 
Allowed Interconn A 2) Is interconnection to the public switched 
network allowed legally ? 
1.0: No 
0.0: Yes 
MktEntryRestr A 3) Are there market entry restrictions specific 
to the below market segments ? (Cable 
television, fixed line internet, other) 
1.0: If there are restrictions in all 3 sectors 
0.67: for restrictions in 2 sectors 
0.33 for restrictions in 1 sector 
0.0: No restrictions 
IncumbentSwitch 
Required 
A 4) Are new market entrants required to use 
the incumbent's international gateway switch ? 
1.0: Yes 
0.0: No 
ResalePermitted A 5) Is 3rd party simple resale of lease line 
capacity permitted ? 
1.0: If not permitted neither domestic nor 
international 
0.5: If permitted only in domestic sector 
0.0: if permitted 
PrivateOwn B 1) is private ownership in the provision of 
services permitted legally ? For existing 
operators? for new entrants? 
(1 - average maximum allowed share of private 
owner) 
ForeignOwn B 2) is foreign ownership in the provision of 
services permitted legally ? For existing 
operators? For new entrants? 
(1- average maximum allowed share of foreign 
owner) 
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ForeignEqRestr B 3) Are there foreign equity restrictions on 
companies offering services in multiple market 
segments (local, long distance, international, 
leased line, internet services) ? 
1.0: Yes 
0.0: No 
WTORefPaper C 2) a) Has the WTO's paper been adopted ? 1.0: No 
decrease by 0.1 for each checked item in the list 
0.0: Yes 
LicensingProcedures C) 4) a)What are the main criteria/procedures 
new entrants must satisfy to be granted a 
service license? 
0.1: license fee 
+0.1: competitive tender 
+0.2: economic needs test 
+0.1: submission of information 
+0.5 discretionary decision by authority 
Internet License C 4) b) is there a licensing regime for internet 
service providers? 
1.0: Yes 
0.0: No 
DifferentForeign 
Criteria 
C 4) d) are foreign firms subject to different 
licensing criteria than domestic firms? 
1.0: Yes 
0.0: No 
Exclusivity C 4) e) Do licenses grant exclusivity periods in 
all or some market segments? 
1.0: Yes 
0.0: No 
GatewaysOwn C 5) b) are service providers (beside 
incumbents) allowed to own or lease their own 
international data gateways? 
1.0: No 
0.0: Yes 
Tariffs C 6) a) how are end-user tariffs determined? 
andC 6) b) are end-user tariffs set by 
0.0: if market forces alone 
0.5: if a price cap is set by regulator, or 
regulator's approval is required 
1.0: if tariffs are set by regulator 
Transparency C 7) a) which of the following are consulted in 
advance of regulatory decisions? 
C 7) b) how are regulatory decisions and laws 
made public ? 
1.0: not transparent 
0.0: very transparent 
UniversalService D 2) what policy instruments are used to ensure 
universal service? 
D 4) How is the universal service provider 
selected? 
0.0: Subsidies to operator, based on competitive 
tender with publicly available criteria 
0.2: Roll-out obligations included in licensing, 
with subsidies 
0.5: roll-out obligations without subsidies 
1.0: subsidies to operator, without competition 
(for example only incumbent operator) 
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